In my research of how PERT became a myth of project management’s power. The key to the success of the Fleet Ballistic Missile program Polaris was great leadership, decentralized organization, and an esprit de corps to save the world from nuclear war. One of the people I ran across was Admiral Levering Smith and reading about the Admiral reminds me of some of the great project managers like Sheila Brady (System 7) and Dennis Adler (Windows 95). I have been lucky to work on both of the operating systems at Apple and Microsoft and saw first hand how these people worked.
Below are highlights from a memorial of Admiral Levering Smith that is here.
Levering knows of his patient, open approach to each new goal—using, and giving credit for, every sound idea and accomplishment. Levering's leadership style was almost the antithesis of that of the textbook, dynamic, emotional leader about which stories are told. He was a leader because he respected the goals of his superiors, respected the responsibilities he had been given, and respected the capabilities of those working for and with him, and he made this apparent to everyone without ever a touch of ego.
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Raborn almost immediately drafted Levering from White Sands to lead this work because of his reputation as the navy's preeminent expert on rockets and solid propellants. It was the beginning of an assignment that ultimately produced the most convincing and effective of the nation's strategic deterrent weapon systems.
Levering's planning, which Admiral Raborn accepted, included an innovative and critically important approach to the definition of the requirements toward which everyone on the team worked.
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The oceanographers and strategists didn't work in isolation. It was Red's and Levering's contention that the entire team should participate so that each member recognized the critical issues and the relative importance of the goals. A "board of directors" was formed, which was called "the steering task group." Red was the chairman, and Levering was the responsible architect of what the task group was to do. Represented were the leaders of the participating universities, the navy commands who would need to support the program, and the responsible executives of the prime contractors and the critical subcontractors. Part of the strategy was to put on the steering task group not the program directors but their bosses. It was a powerful task force, and it spent three months defining the total program including schedules, costs, performance goals, and the distribution of the task among the members. This was a revolution in management. It wasn't a "method"; it was pure Levering— understand the problem; agree on the approach and risks; and define and agree on the real requirements, the schedule relationships, and the resources required. Once the program was defined and understood, the steering task group met nearly monthly agreeing on changes, modifying plans, and adjusting resources. Everyone was focused on the total task, not an individual element. An example of early goal setting was the range of the Polaris. If the Polaris didn't go 1,200 nautical miles, it couldn't justify its existence; similarly, if its accuracy didn't meet a minimum, it shouldn't be created. However, if the accuracy was adequate and the range approached 1,500 to 2,000 nautical miles, a lot of sea room opened up to improve the invulnerability of the submarine. There were no fixed specifications, just the bottom limits to ensure a total system effectiveness— again, pure Levering. Supplementing this broad policy, Levering Smith and Red Raborn initiated and encouraged a true team effort among the military, civil service personnel, and contractors. Adversarial conditions were quickly sorted out and eliminated. In addition, the facts—failures as well as triumphs—were always available to the world outside of the Department of Defense and Congress as needed. This concept had never penetrated normal Washington procurement mores, but it was the foundation for a monumental success. We must hope that history recognizes Levering's fine hand and mind in creating such an environment. This was real management.
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He was what he appeared to be: a highly intelligent, rational, practical engineer with immense respect for those around him, particularly those with good ideas and a reasonable approach to developing them. And above all, he was a gentleman.
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To be continued.